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Abstract
The 'global public good' (GPG) concept has gained increasing attention, in health as well as
development circles. However, it has suffered in finding currency as a general tool for global
resource mobilisation, and is at risk of being attached to almost anything promoting development.
This overstretches and devalues the validity and usefulness of the concept. This paper first defines
GPGs and describes the policy challenge that they pose. Second, it identifies two key areas, health
R&D and communicable disease control, in which the GPG concept is clearly relevant and
considers the extent to which it has been applied. We point out that that, while there have been
many new initiatives, it is not clear that additional resources from non-traditional sources have
been forthcoming. Yet achieving this is, in effect, the entire purpose of applying the GPG concept
in global health. Moreover, the proliferation of disease-specific programs associated with GPG
reasoning has tended to promote vertical interventions at the expense of more general health
sector strengthening. Third, we examine two major global health policy initiatives, the Global Fund
against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the bundling of long-standing international
health goals in the form of Millennium Development Goals (MDG), asking how the GPG
perspective has contributed to defining objectives and strategies. We conclude that both initiatives
are best interpreted in the context of traditional development assistance and, one-world rhetoric
aside, have little to do with the challenge posed by GPGs for health. The paper concludes by
considering how the GPG concept can be more effectively used to promote global health.
Background
Although the health of the world's poor has been an
apparent humanitarian concern of the world's rich for
many years, results based on appeals to such 'humanity'
have not been sufficient. Even recent high-profile engage-
ments by the Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria (GFATM), the United States President's Emer-
gency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, and WHO disease-targeted programs
such as Stop TB and Roll Back Malaria have failed to bring
us to the levels of assistance needed to achieve the health-
related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Beginning in the late 1990s, the suggestion emerged to
address this situation by encouraging policy makers in
rich countries to view health assistance not only as
humanitarian but as a selfish investment in protecting the
health of their own populations. The key concept underly-
ing this new interpretation is that of 'global public goods'
(GPGs) [1].
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and identifies two major health GPGs: health research
and development (R&D), and communicable disease
control. However, just because a problem is global and
formidable, or just because the response is multilateral,
does not necessarily mean that it has anything to do with
the undersupply of GPGs. We show this by considering
two major global health innovations, GFATM and the re-
branding of traditional health objectives in the form of
MDGs. Based on the review, in a concluding section we
suggest three ways in which the GPG concept can be more
effectively deployed to promote global health develop-
ment.
Problems: Why do 'global public goods' require collective 
action?
The GPG concept is an extension of the economic tradi-
tion of classifying goods and services according to where
they stand along two axes: one measuring rivalry in con-
sumption; the other measuring excludability. Pure private
goods are those that we are most used to dealing with in
our day-to-day lives, and are defined as those goods (like
a loaf of bread) that are diminished by use, and thus rival
in consumption, and where individuals may be excluded
from consuming them. At the opposite end of the spec-
trum are pure public goods, which are non-rival (not
diminished by use) and non-excludable (if the good is
produced, it is freely available to all). Public security is an
often-cited example. In between these extremes are
'impure' goods, such as 'club goods', which have low
rivalry but high excludability, and 'common pool goods',
which have low excludability but high rivalry [2]. Clearly
in this case, 'health' itself is a private good, as are the
majority of goods and services used to produce health [3].
One of the fundamentals of public economics is that the
free market – the interplay of individual supply and
demand decisions mediated through the price system –
will result in the provision of less than the collectively
optimal level of public goods. Thus, the state has a role to
play, either in producing the good directly (the traditional
approach) or at least in arranging for its production by a
private firm (the increasingly popular 'outsourcing' strat-
egy). Examples of national public goods run from police
protection to national security to financial regulation to
museums and artistic ensembles. But some goods are
quite clearly public at the global level. The classic case is
greenhouse gas emission control.
A reasonable functional definition would be that a GPG is
"a good which it is rational, from the perspective of a
group of nations collectively, to produce for universal
consumption, and for which it is irrational to exclude an
individual nation from consuming, irrespective of
whether that nation contributes to its financing" [[3],
page 9]. The main issue facing non-national (global or
regional) public good provision is how to ensure collec-
tive action in the absence of a 'government' to directly
finance and/or provide the public good, the response in
the case of national public goods [4].
Given the reluctance of voters to support programs some
of whose benefits are felt beyond the borders, an aspect
deserving special attention is mobilizing non-traditional
sources of finance [5]. Cutting across all aspects of the
GPG concept is the key fact that collective action is in
donor countries' self-interest.
The GPG concept thus has a specific meaning within eco-
nomics. However, it has suffered as it has found currency
as an advocacy tool for global resource mobilisation [6-8].
Since a GPG calls for collective action, then, clearly, one's
favourite program must be producing a GPG. This has
given rise to "fuzziness" and "trendiness" [[9], page 2).
The GPG 'tag' is at risk of being attached to anything of
particular attraction and importance, to the point that, at
the limit, anything promoting development could be con-
sidered a GPG. This is to be avoided, as overstretching the
concept devalues the validity of the point that there really
is a class of GPGs requiring public support or provision
[10].
Priorities I: What GPG areas represent 
priorities in global health?
Indeed, Smith et al [11] suggest that the GPG concept may
perhaps be most usefully applied to just two aspects of
health. The first is research and development (R&D) and
the second is communicable disease control (epidemio-
logical surveillance, immunization, and other preventive
measures). In the next section, we ask how the GPG con-
cept, particularly the need for collective action, has
affected policies and programs in these areas.
Health research and development
Health R&D unquestionably has GPG aspects, and there is
not enough of it in fields that would benefit poor coun-
tries. Historically, the public and the not-for profit sectors
have carried out research resulting in new drugs and treat-
ments, but the private for-profit sector now plays the larg-
est role [12,13]. An important policy question is therefore
how to encourage private sector firms to engage in
research benefiting poor countries and peoples: the ubiq-
uitous '90-10 problem' (that 90% of global R&D spending
in health is targeted at diseases affecting only 10% of the
world's population) [14]. A related but distinct question
is how to bolster the demand for drugs in low-income
countries (and hence firms' willingness to engage in
R&D); we touch on this in a section below in which we
discuss Advance Purchase Commitments and other finan-
cial innovations.Page 2 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Globalization and Health 2007, 3:9 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/9A GPG perspective would argue that provision of ade-
quate R&D related to diseases of the poor requires inno-
vative collective action. This no-more-business-as-usual
attitude has clearly motivated the explosion in the
number of Global Public-Private-Partnerships (GPPPs)
undertaking R&D related to diseases of the poor [15-17].
An order-of-magnitude estimate of GPPPs' annual spend-
ing might be US$1 billion [18]. This may be compared
with total global health R&D spending on the order of
US$100 billion [14]. This sounds small, but when the
US$1 billion is compared to the estimated US$2.5 billion
spent on health R&D by governments in low-and middle-
income countries, the perspective is much more favoura-
ble for the important role played by GPPPs. In the area of
R&D related to "neglected diseases" of the tropics, GPPPs
occupy a decisive position.
Communicable disease control
The GPG perspective supports collective action in the area
of infectious disease control when reduction in disease
prevalence in Country A has a benefit for Country B as
well. Areas in which this is particularly true are diseases for
which eradication is feasible (polio) and diseases that are
highly transmissible around the world, whether by
human carriers (SARS), by trade in products (BSE), or by
animal vectors (West Nile Virus, avian influenza). The
control of antibiotic resistance is a closely related GPG
problem.
As in the case of R&D, the GPG perspective has informed
a number of major new initiatives to provide (not only
develop new means of), communicable disease control.
These include the GAVI Alliance (formerly the Global Alli-
ance for Vaccines and Immunization), Stop TB, Roll Back
Malaria, and others. The main question such initiatives
face is the form that assistance should take.
There are basically three types of public health interven-
tions: vertically targeted interventions (focused immuni-
zation or disease eradication campaigns, for example),
horizontally targeted interventions (universal access to a
basic medical care package including vaccination, for
example), and sector-wide interventions such as capacity
building for improved infrastructure and administration.
For many years, donors and health officials in low- and
middle-income countries gave emphasis to vertical inter-
ventions financed by 'earmarked' funds. Problems with
this approach include duplication and lack of coordina-
tion among projects, 'recipient fatigue' in health minis-
tries forced to administer multiple grants, distortions in
local resource allocation such as poaching skilled person-
nel, and "crowding out" (of which more below) [19]. All
donors and the partner countries have committed them-
selves, through the 2005 Paris Declaration, to pursue har-
monisation of practices, standards, and criteria in foreign
assistance. Yet the urge to compete rather than cooperate
is strong, and well-entrenched donor practices and proto-
cols disappear only stubbornly.
One of the ironies of the current health landscape is that,
as many in the public health community moved away
from vertical interventions towards broader approaches
the GPG perspective has helped to fuel the proliferation of
specific infectious disease-targeted programs. Yet the
experiences of programs in immunization, malaria con-
trol, and tuberculosis control demonstrate that impacts
are limited by sector-wide weaknesses such as lack of a
cold chain, shortages of skilled personnel, insufficient
resources for operating vehicles, etc. The plethora of new
vertical initiatives may contain the seeds of its own failure
if health systems are not generally strengthened (includ-
ing the crucial human resources aspect) [20]. The danger
is that the GPG agenda will promote focused interven-
tions easy to "sell" to voters at home because they address
an identifiable menace, at the expense of broader health
system strengthening. One response is to identify the
health system as a prime 'access good' – not a GPG itself,
but a fundamental requirement for the provision of GPGs
[11].
Additionality and innovative financing
The GPG perspective has contributed to a large number of
new programs. However, some caveats are in order. Pro-
viding an adequate supply of a GPG requires spending
more than would have been spent in the absence of col-
lective action, i.e. "additionality." The additionality
debate is complex, and involves at least three questions:
- At the individual country level, we may ask whether
international assistance for production of GPGs in Coun-
try X reduced (or, in development parlance "crowded
out") Country X's government spending for production of
GPGs. Since most of the countries in question are very
poor and local needs take clear precedence over global
ones, it is probably safe to answer this question in the neg-
ative.
- More pressing is the question whether international
assistance for production of GPGs in Country X reduced
international assistance for production of non-GPGs in
Country X. A direct answer to this question is difficult to
provide because data on foreign assistance at the level of
destination countries are much worse than data by coun-
try of origin. Reisen et al [21], looking at the latter, con-
cluded that the average bilateral donor's allocation of
US$1 to GPG production reduced its spending on non-
GPG foreign assistance by US$0.25.
- Finally, additionality questions may be posed as
between donors. The focus of this particular storm con-Page 3 of 7
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complained that PEPFAR diverts U.S. resources away from
GFATM, a multi-lateral agency, to a bilateral and highly
politicised program. Questions of donor additionality are
not confined to HIV/AIDS. Cohen [17], in looking at the
involvement of GPPPs in health R&D, reports that, in
expert interviews, researchers complain that the new avail-
ability of philanthropic funds for medical research is
"crowding out" funding that would have been received
from government agencies such as the U.S. National Insti-
tutes for Health.
While the additionality of resources is ambiguous, we can
answer a closely related issue definitively. Resources being
used for the provision of GPGs in the area of health R&D
and communicable disease control come from tradi-
tional, not innovative, sources. The typical new initiative
depends on a philanthropic institution for its start-up, fol-
lowed by infusions of government support channelled
through bilateral aid organizations [15]. Yet, the GPG
concept is firmly rooted in the self-interested use of
domestic monies and as such sees funding as distinct from
current aid and philanthropic flows. While there have
been innovative fund raising suggestions ranging from a
tax on airline travel to a global lottery, progress has been
slow. In the health field, Advance Purchase Commitments
and the "front-loading" of international assistance for
immunization via the GAVI Alliance's International
Finance Facility) represent steps forward [22]. In the first
case, donors pre-commit to vaccine purchases if R&D is
successful; in the second, future aid commitments are col-
lateralized so that funds can be raised immediately in the
international bond markets. These are welcome innova-
tions, but they still tap the same source: international
donor agency budgets.
Priorities II: What priority areas in global health 
do not represent GPGs?
Inverting the logic above, in this section we wish to clarify
that a number of the major priorities in global health
today do not represent GPGs. This does not diminish their
importance, but it means that progress in these areas
should not be equated with progress regarding the under-
supply of GPGs. The two innovations we review are the
GFATM and the re-framing of traditional health goals in
the form of time-bound Millennium Development Goals.
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM)
Of the three scourges fought by the GFATM, only tubercu-
losis can be said with accuracy to represent a global public
"bad." Malaria has significant cross-border aspects, but
these make malaria control a regional public good (and
one requiring collective action at the regional level), not a
global one. Apart from R&D aspects, the public good
problems associated with HIV/AIDS are regional at most,
not global [23]. Despite inflammatory rhetoric heard at
the beginning of the pandemic, HIV/AIDS has not proven
to be a disease that spreads globally like SARS or pan-
demic influenza. Obvious cross-border aspects like trans-
mission associated with long-haul truckers and migrant
workers in Southern Africa call for a regional, not a global
response.
Even if its transmission did qualify HIV/AIDS as a GPG,
the GFATM response is not dealing with the disease using
GPG logic. The main concern of GFATM (and PEPFAR,
and the WHO's "Three by Five" program, and the G8
nations' commitment to universal access by 2010) is the
provision of subsidized antiretroviral therapy (ART) to
AIDS sufferers in low-income countries. ART is rival (ther-
apy made available to one person or nation cannot be
made available to another) and excludable (persons can
be barred from receiving it). By contrast, AIDS prevention,
in the form of media campaigns, condom distribution,
voluntary counselling and testing, reduction of sexually
transmitted infections, and encouragement of male cir-
cumcision, is non-rival (if A remains HIV-negative as a
result of a prevention program, his sex partners B and C
are protected equally) and non-excludable (no one can
prevent C from enjoying the same protection as B).
Another argument runs that the destabilizing effect of
HIV/AIDS in seriously affected countries gives rise to glo-
bal impacts, but so do the destabilizing effects of every-
thing else, like unemployment and hunger, that
contribute to misery. And again, even it the disease's
destabilizing potential did qualify it as a GPG, the interna-
tional policy response does not prioritize GPG aspects. In
a world of finite resources, the provision of ART in low-
income countries must come at the expense of prevention
(if resources were not finite, of course, such tragic choices
would not need to be made). The lopsided cost-ineffec-
tiveness of ART means that each disability-adjusted life
year (DALY) saved by treatment comes at the expense of
many, many more DALYs lost in the future because the
prevention measures needed to reduce transmission can-
not be implemented [[24], p. 139]. If it were the looming
scale of the AIDS catastrophe and its global spill over
effects that were of greatest concern to donors, they would
give priority to prevention, not treatment.
The need for collective action against AIDS was not the
driving force behind the founding GFATM. It was born
rather of frustration, especially on the part of AIDS activ-
ists, that good ideas from the field were not receiving
deserved support because of donor red tape [25]. The
response was to be a funding agency which would not
assess proposals itself, relying rather on an independent
panel, and would use local accounting firms to monitorPage 4 of 7
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focusing resources quickly on 'best shot' programs in
countries with greatest need, as well as raising the profile
of the disease. The hands-off approach to program formu-
lation and implementation, it was argued, would mean
that the GFATM would have no agenda of its own; aid-
recipient countries would be able (through their represen-
tation on the review panel) to set their own priorities. The
absence of a programmatic/operational agenda would
allow the Fund to concentrate on mobilising and disburs-
ing resources [26]. In sum, the rationale for the GFATM
was not so much that a GPG was being undersupplied,
but that assistance was not being provided efficiently or in
a way consistent with needs.
Even if the GFATM is interpreted as a bold initiative – and
not all do so, since most proposals still come through gov-
ernments – we run into the caveats made above. The Fund
may have generated additional resources or it may not
have – the fact that it has struggled against resource con-
straints practically since its inception [26] gives some rea-
son to suspect the latter. So do anecdotes making the
rounds that the arrival of GFATM in some countries has
led bilateral donors (apart from the US, through PEPFAR)
to limit their own AIDS efforts. GFATM has not mobilized
non-traditional sources of finance. As of mid-2007, out of
the US$10.9 billion cumulatively pledged for all three dis-
eases through 2008, only US$707 million comes from
private firms, foundations, and individuals; this consists
almost in its entirety of a US$650 million grant from the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. With its resources
being pledged almost entirely from traditional donor
countries' aid budgets, the GFATM is replicating the
source-structure of existing aid flows.
A word on the U.S. PEPFAR is in order. PEPFAR promises
US$15 billion (US$9 billion of which are claimed to rep-
resent new resources) for the global fight against AIDS but
only allocates US$1 billion to GFATM [27]. Over half of
the resources are targeted to providing AIDS treatment. Of
funds allocated to prevention, a significant proportion is
earmarked for faith-based programs encouraging teen-
aged sexual abstinence and discouraging multiple-partner
sex. The ability of PEPFAR to finance activities benefiting
key target populations – commercial sex workers and
injecting drug users – is tightly constrained by law. It is
hard to consider PEPFAR as collective provision of a GPG
when the resources it makes available could have been
channelled through a genuinely collective institution
(GFATM) and when its prevention programs are designed
to cater to a domestic political constituency.
The Millennium Development Goals for Health
The main focus of global health development at present is
the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(General Assembly, A/55/L.2, September 18, 2000).
The targets associated with the health MDGs are to: (i)
reduce child mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and
2015; (ii) reduce the maternal mortality ratio by three
quarters between 1990 and 2015; (iii) halt and begin to
reverse the spread of AIDS by 2015; and (iv) halt and
begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major
diseases by 2015. Developed countries and the develop-
ment agencies will, in return for low- and middle-income
countries' devoting effort to attaining the MDGs, take pri-
mary responsibility to establish a global partnership for
development. In the area of health, the associated target
is: (v) provide, in cooperation with pharmaceutical com-
panies, access to affordable essential drugs in developing
countries.
How do MDGs for health relate to the GPG perspective?
Some of them, for example, those related to tuberculosis
and access to drugs (or at least the R&D aspect of that
problem), address GPG problems directly. Others, for
example those related to maternal mortality, most child
mortality, and HIV/AIDS, respond to humanitarian con-
cerns, not GPG problems.
As in the case of the GFATM, when we look carefully at the
origins of the MDG approach, we find that GPG logic is
absent. The MDGs emerged from profound dissatisfaction
with the effectiveness of aid to date and insistence on a
"results focus" and improved monitoring and evaluation
[28]. This process is the elaboration of a Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper or PRSP [29]; the PRSP process, in turn
is meant to encourage countries to adopt a long-term
vision "by bringing out explicit awareness of poverty
issues and promoting participation of stakeholders" [[29],
page 11). PRSPs are meant to be country-driven ('owner-
ship'), results-oriented, and participatory; reflect input of
civil society and the private sector [30]. Countries are
meant to prioritize the MDGs in accordance with their
long-term vision of development needs. The PRSP process
is also meant to force explicit linkages between fiscal
resource allocation decisions and poverty reduction
through the putting-in-place of Medium-term Expendi-
ture Frameworks or MTEFs [31].
"We will recognize country ownership and a partnership
of equals," runs the donor governments' position, "if you
will deliver results and ensure stakeholder participation."
"We will deliver results and ensure stakeholder participa-
tion," runs beneficiary governments' position, "if you will
acknowledge country ownership and a partnership of
equals." This is a laudable win-win outcome – but itPage 5 of 7
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not to the need for collective action to supply GPGs.
"Country ownership" and acceding to equal partnership
are the last things that would be stressed in an approach
built on GPG logic. Far from encouraging donor-country
voters to support generous foreign aid programs because
they are in their own interest, these discourage them from
doing so [25].
To conclude, the two initiatives examined show that mas-
sive mobilization of humanitarian assistance in pursuit of
common goals should not be confused with collective
action to ensure the adequate supply of GPGs. That obser-
vation does not lessen the importance of such actions, but
it guards us against the fallacy of concluding that, just
because there is a multiplication of high-profile innova-
tions, fundamental GPG problems are being effectively
addressed.
Potential: How can the GPG perspective best be 
used to promote global health?
The GPG concept, discovered by the aid community in the
late 1990s, can be a powerful tool in promoting global
health because it marshals arguments of self-interest. It
can be used to identify areas in which global collective
action is needed, specify where the costs and benefits will
rest and communicate to the public why spending to pro-
mote health thousands of kilometers around the world is
not a waste of their tax dollars. Yet, we find that the GPG
perspective has been a mixed blessing.
We looked at two acknowledged GPGs related to health,
namely R&D and communicable disease control. While
recognition of the need for global collective action has
supported a large number of new initiatives, it remains to
be determined what the result is in terms of additional
funds. Those funds that have been generated have come
from traditional philanthropic and public sources. The
proliferation of infectious disease initiatives has pro-
moted a vertical, "stovepipe" approach, to the detriment
of broad health sector strengthening.
We then looked at two of the major global innovations in
health, the GFATM (and, closely related, PEPFAR) and the
re-packaging of traditional health concerns in the form of
MDGs. We concluded that both can be more easily under-
stood as addressing weaknesses in traditional humanitar-
ian aid – red tape, lack of country ownerships, insufficient
stakeholder involvement, need for results-based manage-
ment, etc. – than as addressing problems of GPG provi-
sion.
All of the new initiatives we have discussed here, and
many that we have not mentioned, are funding or doing
valuable work. How might the GPG perspective
strengthen them and lead to other efforts, as well?
First and foremost, within existing programs and when
proposing new ones, the aid community should adhere to
the strict economic definition and avoid the temptation to
use the GPG 'tag' as a general-purpose fund-raiser. If we
focus GPG logic on those goods and services where global
collective action really is needed, that action is more likely
to be achieved. Where humanitarian grounds, not rational
self interest, are the main motivation for action – as in
providing subsidized treatment for AIDS sufferers in poor
countries – we should say so without equivocation. Where
general health system strengthening is required to guaran-
tee access to GPGs such as immunization or tuberculosis
control, this should be stated explicitly, even if it means
that budgets for GPG provision strictly defined may be
reduced as a result.
Second, the aid community should stress to policy makers
that, where the GPG label is appropriate, as in the case of
communicable disease control, what is needed is not only
new packaging/labeling of existing resources, but
resources additional to those already being made available,
which means mobilizing innovative sources of financing.
The current elevated level of concern over emergent dis-
eases, including pandemic influenza, is an ideal context in
which to press for a more pro-active response. So is the
rapid development of financial engineering tools related
to aid, such as advance purchase commitments, collateral-
ization future aid commitments in the bond market so as
to "frontload" aid, etc.
Third, the relative ease of financing disease-specific
actions, as opposed to broad sector strengthening, should
not be allowed to distort health sector policy or dictate the
structure of support. Where sector support serves an
"access" function, the argument that it is a prerequisite for
provision of GPGs (essentially, communicable disease
control) can be used to strengthen its claim on resources.
The aim of this paper was to provide an introduction to
the key concepts, and to consider some innovative devel-
opments in global health from the GPG perspective.
Hopefully this has illustrated the potential and limita-
tions of the concept, and provided a foundation for fur-
ther discussion of these.
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